netic" and "environmental") phenomena as mutually exclusive. Modern molecular genetics and neuroscience are very clear in indicating that mammalian behaviors are intricate symphonies that interweave genetic and nongenetic harmonies. The learning of environmental contingencies and consequences, as well as the long-term memory of such events, is associated with "turning genes on and off" (technically, the regulation of gene expression). Consider a teenager with a major pimple on prom night: One effect of his or her elevated cortisol is to enhance the expression of some genes and inhibit the expression of others. Behavior is "lemonade" (Carey, 2003) . It is a solution-an inextricable combination of genes and environments, of the social and the biological. Placing a complicated construct like race into a discrete "social" or "biological" box makes as much sense as asking whether lemonade is (a) lemon juice, (b) water, or (c) sugar. I maintain that no argument should be regarded as a closed one when there are so many psychologists on both sides of a scientific position. In one study (Snyderman & Rothman, 1988) , over a thousand psychologists and other experts in intelligence testing were surveyed regarding the Black-White IQ difference. Fifteen percent said the reasons for the discrepancy were entirely environmental; 46% said they were at least partly genetic; 24% said the evidence was inconclusive; and 14% did not respond. The fact that 24% of the experts surveyed expressed uncertainty means that more research and dialogue rather than a "case closed" orientation is needed.
My second concern is that of the insufficient respect given to the work of Rushton (1995) , who contended that greater intelligence evolved in colder climates because of the greater difficulty in obtaining food and protection from the elements. Sternberg et al. (2005) maintained that Rushton's position has no more merit than contending that greater intelligence evolved in tropical climates because of the need to cope with tropical diseases and the violence associated with hot weather. Sternberg et al. (2005) said, "Indeed, post hoc evolutionary arguments made in the absence of fossils at times can have the character of ad hoc 'just so' stories designed to support, in retrospect, whatever point the author wishes to make about present-day peo-ple" (p. 50). Rushton presented a vast array of scientific evidence in his conceptualization, for example, a correlation of .62 between cranial capacity and distance from the equator with 20,000 crania representing 122 ethnically distinguishable populations (Beals, Smith, & Dodd, 1984) . Templer and Arikawa (2003) reported a correlation of Ϫ.71 between mean IQ and mean high winter temperature and a correlation of Ϫ.61 between mean IQ and mean low winter temperature with 129 countries. There are alternative explanations to those of Rushton for such findings. To relegate Rushton's theory to the realm of absurdity, however, would neither constitute optimal scientific reasoning nor represent an ideal spirit of scholarly disagreement. the pitfalls in the study of intelligence and race, discerning between folklore and science. Similar scrutiny is needed of the premise underlying these articles: that the nature-nurture paradigm is a scientific fact. Ultimately, the validity of statistical formulae derived from Galton's thesis depends on unproven assumptions. Further, a dimensional ontology allows expansion of the theoretical perspective. The idea that nature and nurture make us who we are is easily distilled into a statistical formula: In terms of variance, "heritability and environmentality add to unity" (Sternberg et al., 2005, p. 53) . The first assumption, termed exclusivity, stems directly from that idea: Only nature and nurture make us who we are. This leads to a paradigmatic requirement: No influences exist other than genetics and environment. The second assumption implicit in the body of nature-nurture research, termed universality, is that the paradigm is valid for every human trait studied. An example will illuminate both assumptions.
A century ago, phenylketonuria (PKU) was purely heritable in terms of variability: The inability to metabolize phenylalanine resulted from a genetic deficiency. Fifty years ago, a scientist discovered its mechanism and prescribed a palliative diet deficient in phenylalanine. Today, PKU is cited as exemplary of nature-nurture interaction (e.g., Sternberg et al., 2005) . However, a crack has appeared: Science has given each person the freedom to be tested and to follow the diet. Even for a physiological disorder such as PKU, nature and nurture do not account for all influences; the ability to choose likely accounts for most of the variability today, thus violating the exclusivity assumption. If one extends this example, on that theoretical day when human DNA is completely understood, Galton's (1869/1892) paradigm will be refuted definitively: Scientists will have maximized human choice while minimizing adverse aspects of genetic inheritance.
If a physiological disorder might result from more than nature and nurture, then what about psychological traits, in which the effects of human abilities such as choice, free will, responsibility, meaning, purpose, and spirituality may be magnified? If PKU provides even a single exception to the universality assumption, then Galton's paradigm must be validated for each trait studied.
A third assumption, complementarity, must also be addressed: Nature and nurture constitute a linear dichotomy, even in interaction. Note the wording of Sternberg et al.'s (2005) translation of Galton's paradigm quoted earlier: Nature and nurture "add to" one. As Sternberg et al. (2005) noted, "Heritability has a complementary concept, that of environmentality" (p. 53). This dichotomous structure requires that variation from any other source automatically be included under heritability, environmentality, and/or their interaction, thus precluding its consideration outside of the paradigm (Biddell & Fischer, 1997) . In the example of PKU, if heritability is minimized, is environmentality correspondingly increased? However, as mentioned earlier, the ability to choose likely has become the greatest source of variability.
A dimensional ontology allows a more parsimonious inclusion of these factors. Viktor Frankl (1967) noted that the person lives in three interpenetrating dimensions: soma (the physical body), psyche (the emotions and intellect), and the noëtic (the soul). The noëtic dimension includes free will, responsibility, choice, spirituality, and the unique meaning capacity of Homo sapiens. Although animals share soma and psyche with humans, the noëtic is defined as that which differentiates us from animals (Frankl, 1967) . In this ontology, genetic expression is somatic in origin-genes synthesize amino acids, pure and simple; nurture occurs in both soma and psyche. From this perspective, nature and nurture are dimensionally different rather than complementary.
The existence of dimensional causes other than heritability and environmentality violates all three assumptions. Theorists have proposed factors that operate in conjunction with genetics and environment, such as symbol systems (language, science, math, musical notation; Gardner, Hatch, & Torff, 1997) and human agency (choice, free will; Biddell & Fischer, 1997; Frankl, 1967) . Assuming that animals do not have language, science, and math, nor the choice and free will needed for agency, these distinctly human variables are noëtic (Frankl, 1967) . How do they affect nature-nurture research?
Studies of twins with regard to language development and IQ invariably involve the measure of noëtic symbol systems, using the manipulation of language and/or representations of math or logic. Similar studies of substance abuse ignore the noëtic dimension: The most successful treatment involves 12-step programs that invoke a "Higher Power" to strengthen the ability to choose. Twin studies of career selection paradoxically assume that only nature and nurture determine choice, precluding the Jungian sense of "finding one's
